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Abstract
The purpose of this work is the structural modelling of price competition in a product-
di!erentiated industry in whic h many "rms of varying size c ompete ac ross many 
independent small markets, with the target of identifying price behaviour. We apply it to 
model competition among the more than 79 banks that were active in the Spanish loans 
market during the period 1983}1991, using micropanel data. A model in which national 
banks (as opposed to regional and local banks) fully internalize their cross-rate e!ects in 
pric ing is selec ted as the model that best "ts the data. Our framework allows us to 
estimate the dead-weight loss due to market power, and to decompose it assessing the 
part attributable to price c oordination. 
JEL classixcation: L13; G21
Keywords: Price behaviour; Independent markets; Market power; Price coalitions
1. Introduction
Since the early 1980s the European banking industry has been the object of
many regulatory changes with the goal being to enhance competition. Market
1
See Sutton (1998) on the notion of independent submarkets, and De Juan (1999) on its
applicability to the geographic structure of Spanish retail banking.
power in the bank loans market during this period has been found to be
substantial, although decreasing over time in some activities as the result of the
impact of deregulation (see Neven and RoK ller, 1999). Spain was one of the
countries to apply such policies intensively. During the 1980s, Spanish authori-
ties liberalized interest rates and commissions, promoted entry to the industry
(mainly of foreign banks), and removed barriers to encourage competition from
savings banks. Loan pricing behaviour, however, had still not shown any
apparent changes in Spain by the end of our sample period (1991), even though
changes in conduct began to appear in the compensation of deposits 2 years
before.
The reason has been informally attributed to the di$culty of breaking up
coordination between banks in a highly concentrated market despite the great
number of competing entities (more than 79). In fact, the six largest private
banks (reduced to four through two mergers by the end of the period) accounted
for more than half of the branches and loans, and led corporate groups that 20
additional banks belonged to. Although at the other end of the distribution
there were an important number of small regional, local and foreign banks,
which together with the savings banks were intended to put pressure on
competition, it is a fact that they compromised with persistently high interest
rates. This makes the Spanish market of the period an interesting asymmetrical
context in which to investigate price behaviour and, in particular, to try to
uncover the speci"c form of bank pricing coordination.
To investigate price behaviour, we apply an industry model in which many
banks that supply a slightly di!erentiated product (loans) compete across many
independent geographic submarkets. Product di!erentiation raises symmetric
rate e!ects at the local level (i.e. the banks in a given local market compete with
each other), but bank activities are unequally distributed across markets, which
determines unequal sizes. This model is both suitable and serves a purpose. On
the one hand, it closely mirrors the structure of banking. Banks can be seen in
their two main activities (deposits, loans) competing across many small indepen-
dent local submarkets (quarters of cities, towns2), where each branch faces the
rivalry of the other branches in the market, but di!ering in the local markets
they cover. On the other, it o!ers a precise guide for how to specify the
unequal patterns expected for the own and cross-price e!ects in the context of
many asymmetrical "rms, and hence, how to constrain them for estimation
purposes.
Our empirical exercise consists of the estimation of the (constrained) own and
cross rate e!ects for 79 banks (with data on the loans granted and the rates
charged by these banks from 1983 to 1991) and the testing of competing
2
We deal with the problem of the number of parameters to be estimated in a product di!erenti-
ated industry (Bresnahan, 1989; Berry, 1994) by applying direct constraints on the structure of price
e!ects (similar to, for example, Slade, 1986, 1992). A di!erent approach is the discrete-choice
speci"cation of demands (see Berry et al., 1995).
 In testing a given number of well-de"ned equilibrium hypotheses, as opposed to testing a single
behaviour or checking the value of some unspeci"ed behavioural parameter, we adopt the practice
pioneered by Gasmi et al. (1992) and followed, among others, by PazoH and Jaumandreu (1999).
hypotheses of behaviour, using the estimated e!ects to specify alternative pricing
equations. The estimates of the model are then used to perform an analysis
of welfare loss due to the exercise of market power and, in particular, the part
due to price coordination. It is, therefore, an exercise in the tradition of the
empirical studies of industries with market power (see Bresnahan's (1989)
survey).
The structural modelling of the oligopolistic interaction in banking has
recently been a subject of interest. Even starting from a di!erent theoretical
framework, our study shares many of the characteristics of Barros (1999)
work: the market is taken as di!erentiated and consisting of submarkets;
market structure is exploited to obtain the theoretically based relationships;
and several equilibria are tested. But Neven and RoK ller (1999) also
provide an example of structural modelling at a country-aggregate level that
clearly justi"es the relevance of more detailed works for the European banking
industry.
Estimates of our model are sensible, the results of the test point to the
superiority of partially collusive models in explaining the data (suggesting
a price coalition of the national banks), and the welfare dead-weight loss is
estimated in some years to be a quarter of a percentage point of the national
GDP. This validates the common belief about collusive behaviour a!ecting the
loan rates of the main Spanish banks at the time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our assump-
tions on the optimizing behaviour of banks. Section 3 speci"es demands and
discusses their estimation, as well as the equilibria to be considered and the way
to test them against each other. Section 4 summarizes the relevant facts in the
Spanish loans market during the period. Section 5 explains the empirical model,
Section 6 presents the econometric results, and Section 7 performs the welfare
analysis. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the conclusions.
2. The optimizing behaviour of banks
Wemodel banks along the lines of the so-calledMonti}Klein model of a bank
with market power (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997), in a version with product
di!erentiation and some dynamics. Banks can borrow or lend in the interbank
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market at a given interest rate, which constitutes the (common) marginal cost of
funds. The pro"t of a bank is therefore the sum of the intermediationmargins on
loans and deposits minus management costs. If management costs are additive,
the decisions regarding the lending and borrowing rates of the banks are
separable. In this and the following sections, for the sake of simplicity, we take
management costs to be zero. In the empirical application, we will reintroduce it
in the simplest form of a constant unit management cost.
For the period that we study, most of the loans were formalized under
"xed interest rates. Therefore, we assume that the target of the banks
is to maximize the discounted intertemporal #ow of expected pro"ts that
will be derived from the credit open (or renewed) at a given moment of
time. For example, the problem solved by a Bertrand player in order to
optimally set the interest rates at each moment t is (dropping the player's
subindex for simplicity)
Max
   2
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at time t under the interest rate r

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 is the discount factor, and S represents the maximum length of time at which
some credit open at t will remain.
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where i is a polynomial in anticipations of the interbank rate, and
	

"1/l

l

/r

 is the Bertrand semi-elasticity of the demand for new credit at
time t. That is, the bank will set at time t the loans rate with a margin over its
(weighted) expectations on the interbank rate, this margin depending on the
inverse of the elasticity of current demand for new credit. In addition, the
4

Assume that, at time t, the bank forecasts a unit management cost c for the S periods (the change
over time of this cost is considered negligible). Then, E(
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marginal cost de"nition implied by (1) can easily be enlarged to include manage-
ment costs
 and risk.
If banks play a game other than Bertrand, the pro"t maximization objective
must be changed accordingly and the elasticity obtained in the analogous of (1)
will re#ect the assumed interactions among rivals.
3. The industry model: Demands and equilibria
Now we must specify the individual bank demands for new credit
l

"l

(r

, r

), where i"12N and we drop the time subindex for simplicity.
Next, we must specify the alternative types of behaviour we are going to
consider and test. Our speci"cations are based on the presumption that the
global market consists of many independent geographic submarkets. In addi-
tion we suppose that banks operate across these submarkets without discrimi-
nating rates geographically (which generally seems to be the case in banking),
but this is not a crucial assumption and could be relaxed and the model adapted.
3.1. Demands specixcation and estimation
We take global unrestricted demands to be
l

"a

!b

r

#

d

r

, i, j"12N. (2)
This implies, in principle, a matrix of rate e!ects B"l

/r

	 with N di!erent
elements, that can only be estimated by imposing strong constraints on them.
We assume that there are many local markets, that are independent in the sense
of the absence of price spillovers among them, and that every bank operates in
an arbitrary number of these submarkets where competitors meet. Assume that,
at the local level, competing banks are basically symmetric: the own and
cross-rate e!ects of local demands are equal for all the market participants.
Supposing for the moment that local markets can be considered identical
(except for the identity of the participants), then a number of strong results
follow for global demands.
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Note that this e!ect is bounded by the size of the incumbent and, more importantly, it does not
follow automatically from the size of the rival.
This number must be considered endogeneous in the long run, jointly determined by the size of
the local market (the number and income of consumers), the "xed cost associated with entry, and the
industry degree of toughness in price competition.
 In a market with a given degree of product di!erentiation and linear demands, the demand
intercept for each "rm decreases with N, while the (absolute value of the) own-price e!ect and the
sum of the cross e!ects increase. The elasticities of the own-price e!ect and the sum of the
cross-e!ects with respect to N are, however, of order 1/N, and hence the changes from market to
market can be perhaps neglected. But the elasticities of the intercept and the individual cross-e!ects
with respect to N will usually not be far from unity and must be taken into account. On all this see
Jaumandreu and Lorences (1997).
Firstly, the global own-rate e!ect of each bank will be proportional to the
number of submarkets in which the bank operates. Secondly, the total cross-rate
e!ect of a rival will be proportional to the number of submarkets in which the
rival is encountered. In addition, the cross-rate e!ects of any two competitors
will be symmetric, because they depend exclusively on the number of coincid-
ences across markets.
However, actual local markets di!er from each other in one apparent charac-
teristic: the number of banks. In this case, the constraints implied by the
independent geographic submarkets hypothesis change slightly. The own-rate
e!ects may again be considered proportional to the number of markets in which
the bank operates (though now only approximately) and symmetry is preserved,
but the correct assessment of cross-e!ects must weight the coincidences with
a rival according to the expected e!ect of each coincidence given the number of
banks in the place of the match.
According to the above discussion suppose there are K local markets, which
we index by k. Call b the local own-rate e!ect, which we take as invariant across
markets. Call d the coe$cient of the market k common cross-rate e!ect, which
we specify varying across markets as d (N

) with 
(0. Then, aggregating
across markets, b

"bK

, where K

is the number of markets at which bank
i operates; and d

"dK

, whereK

"
 
 (N

) (a weighted sum of coincid-
ences). We can then construct two indices that embody these constraints,
rH

"(K

/K)r

and rH

"

(K

/K)r

. Using these indices (2) can be trans-
formed in an equation with only two price parameters to be estimated,
l
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"a

#b

rH

#b

rH

with b

"bK and b

"dK. However, the whole matrix
B of rate e!ects can be recovered from this estimation given the K, K

and
K

numbers.
3.2. Equilibria and testing
Let us turn now to the supply side of the market. We envisage banks as
having previously carried out their location decisions across markets and then
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competing in rates given these decisions. Therefore, in setting rates, each bank
takes its global demand as given and conveying the relevant information about
the e!ects of its own and rivals' rates on demand.
Now we must specify the set of equilibrium outcomes resulting from the
competing behavioural hypotheses. Firstly, it seems natural to take the behav-
iourally symmetric equilibria of Bertrand}Nash and full collusion as extreme
competitive benchmarks. The Cournot}Nash equilibrium also appears as a use-
ful intermediate case (on Bertrand and Cournot in a di!erentiated product
context see Vives (1985)). But symmetric behaviour seems, a priori, not very
realistic in a structurally strong asymmetric market. Large competitors are
likely to act strategically with respect to their major rivals found in many
submarkets. Smaller competitors are likely to present tougher competition to
big rivals in the places they coincide. In addition, alliances among more or less
complementary banks may arise as a way of increasing market coverage. We
must include therefore the possibility that groups of banks coordinate (explicitly
or implicitly) their pricing, in the sense of taking into account the cross e!ects of
their rates, playing more or less competitively with respect to the rest of the
banks (i.e. the price coalitions studied by Deneckere and Davidson (1985)). We
will do that by adding a version of the two competitive equilibria already
mentioned with coordination of the banks belonging to the same corporate
group (Bertrand}Nash by groups and Cournot}Nash by groups), and also
a partial collusion or price coalition equilibrium, in which a broader, but de"nite
group of banks, coordinates and plays Bertrand with respect to the rest.
Assume that there are G non-overlapping groups, indexed g"12G. Specify
behaviour by maximizing the joint pro"ts by groups (or total pro"ts for full
collusion), selecting the suitable variable (prices or quantities). The "rst order
conditions corresponding to each of the six equilibria mentioned above may be
obtained from the equations that follow, derived by solving the relevant dy-
namic problems as set out in Section 2 and simplifying the solutions by writing
them in terms of i :
l

#(r

!i) l
r

# 

	
(r

!i) l
r

"0, i"12N, g"12G, (3)
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
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l

# 

	
l

r

l

"0, i"12N, g"12G. (3
)
Eq. (3) represents Bertrand by groups, but collapses to Bertrand if every group
consists of a single "rm, and gives the formulae corresponding to a price
coalition if we assume there is only one global group of colluding "rms, say the
group h. Eq. (3
) corresponds to Cournot equilibria and can also represent full
collusion when all "rms are taken to belong to a unique group.
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Details on this process, in an analysis at the European level, may be found in Gual and Neven
(1992). On competition banks vs. savings banks, see Coello (1996).
Unfortunately, the time dimension of the panel renders very di$cult any other treatment of
mergers.
By solving the appropriate systems, we can obtain the series of price equations
analogous to (1), r

"i#1/


for i"12N, where we express margins over
costs in terms of semi-elasticities, and where E indexes the equilibrium concepts
(see Appendix A). Given (2), obtaining explicit individual expressions for the
semi-elasticities involved in all the non-Bertrand equilibria is precluded. The
reason is that these expressions include elements of the inverses of either
the whole rate e!ects matrix or speci"c submatrices of it. This suggests a two-
step procedure for testing for the equilibrium outcomes. First, obtain an esti-
mate of the whole rate e!ects matrix. Then, compute the semi-elasticities
corresponding to the di!erent equilibrium concepts, and test for their relative
merits in explaining the price-cost data.
The equilibrium that best "ts the data can be determined as follows. Given the
semi-elasticities, we can estimate the corresponding set of price equations of the
type r

"i#(1/( 
)#u

, where u

is a disturbance term and  is an auxiliary
parameter whose value can be taken as a speci"cation test. These price equa-
tions are overlapping models that can be compared by means of a Vuong-type
test for model selection (see Vuong, 1989).
4. The Spanish loans market and the data
Our sample period, 1983}1991, is a time of important regulatory and struc-
tural changes for the whole of Spanish banking activity (see Table 1). On the
regulatory side, the period is a time of increasing liberalization, particularly with
respect to banking rates and entry. On the structural side, a mix of trends must
be noted. Firstly, banks "nd an increasingly serious rival in savings banks, which
extend their activities, thereby becoming closer competitors. On the contrary,
direct entry was only constituted by the opening of central o$ces of foreign
banks, and its immediate competitive e!ect is probably very small, despite its
apparent quantitative importance. Secondly, there is an increase in concentra-
tion. At the beginning of the period, several small banks went bankrupt; at the
end of the period, there was a wave of mergers and acquisitions.
To simplify things, we have dealt with turbulence (small entry and exit), and
also with mergers and acquisitions, in the simplest form: we have dropped banks
that were born or died in these years from the sample, and we have treated the
merging parts as a single entity during the whole period. Thus, we work with
a balanced panel. This gives the 79 entities sample that we use in the tables and
the econometric work. This sample accounts for more than 90% of private bank
loans.
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Our basic data consists of individual yearly observations on the total amount
of credit granted, and the declared preferential (best client) rates charged, as well
as detailed information on the geographical areas in which they operate (the
number of branches they hold in each of the 51 administrative divisions or
provinces, on a yearly basis). In addition, for every bank we know the total
amount charged by way of percentage commissions, we have some information
on the structure of the loans, and we know the total amount of management
costs and the value of deposits. All this information comes from the individual
yearly balance sheets published by the banks' trade association (AEB), with the
exception of the rates. The preferential rates are individually declared on
a monthly basis to the Bank of Spain. The rates we use are the yearly averages of
the rates declared for 1-year loans. To avoid the e!ects of the regulatory
changes, we will use what we call the e!ective rates on loans, or loan rates plus
the percentage commissions on loans.
Table 2 summarizes the structure of the industry. Size asymmetry and
concentration are very strong, and are clearly associated with the geographical
coverage of the national territory with the networks of branches. Half
of the banks are involved in corporate groups (identi"ed by the trade
association). These groups are led by the banks with national scope, and the
degree of "nancial and decisional control of the small group members is usually
high.
The average of the (preferential) loan rates set by the banks shows a clear
relationship with the interbank rate, disrupted only by two yearly interbank
rates that are especially high due to monetary regulations (see Table 1). It is
known that a change in short-run banking behaviour took place in 1989, in the
form of a price war over the compensation on deposits. It is frequently analysed
as a reaction of the banks to the increasing competition from savings banks.
From Table 1 it is clear that this change did not a!ect, at least at this moment,
behaviour in the loans market.
5. Empirical speci5cation
Firstly, we must specify the empirical relationship aimed at estimating the
new credit demands' parameters. Unfortunately, we can only directly observe
the banks' stock of total credit ¸ at each moment t. However, we know that
¸

"l

!c

#¸

, where c

represents cancellations of credits at t. If the
structure of the 's is close to an exponential law (

K), it is easy to show that
this identity can be approximated by the relationship ¸

"l

#¸

, where
l

and its parameters may be estimated at the same time as .
Accordingly, we specify the demand equation as
¸

"a

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z

#b

rH

#b
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rH

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
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#u

, (4)
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where ¸ is total real loans, in thousands of millions of (1983) monetary units,
and the rH's are the (indices of) real e!ective interest rates, expressed in percent-
age points. We can distinguish three parts. The two "rst terms, a

#a
z

, are
destined to model the new credit demand intercepts in two components: an
unobservable, bank-speci"c and time-invariant component, and another de-
pending on a vector of variables z

to control for speci"c changes over time. The
three following terms are aimed at picking up the e!ects of the interest rates:
own, rivals' and of the savings banks, indexed C. Finally, we allow for a variable
 parameter, depending on an x

vector of variables that can shift its value. The
term u

stands for a zero mean random disturbance that we will assume to be
uncorrelated across banks and time, but cross-sectionally heteroscedastic.
The data on branches of the 79 banks in 51 provinces during 9 years o!er
more than 35 000 "gures that we have used to build up the weighting scheme.
Provinces are obviously not the small independent markets that we envisage in
the theoretical model, but we use these data together with some ancillary
assumptions to approximate the weight of the underlying small independent
submarkets. The weighted interest rates indices have been calculated
as rH

"w

r

, rH

"



w

r

"

w

r

and rH

"

w

C

r

,
where w

is the approximation of the proportion of total markets in which the
bank is present (K

/K), and w

is the approximation of the weights of the
markets of province m in which competitors i and j coincide, that takes into
account the number of rivals (the sum of w

across provinces approximates
K

/K). Finally, w

C

constitutes a province-speci"c measure of the competi-
tive pressure of savings banks on bank i. Appendix B gives details.
The z

intercept vector includes the proportion w

to account for the
expansion (or contraction) of the markets where the bank was present during the
period, a weighted index of the rate of increase (at time t#1) of the correspond-
ing regional gross domestic products, 

w

GDP

, and the same variable
interacting with a dummy foreign bank. The right modelization of the  para-
meter is an important issue if the intertemporal structure of loans is di!erent
from bank to bank, or has been changing over time. These two dimensions of
heterogeneity are present, and the lagged proportion of mortgages in the total
loans mtg

and a cyclical inverse indicator (the rate of failures in credits #

)
are the variables used to account for them.
We specify the interest rate equations as
r

"

# 



i

##

#
 cos t

# 1
( 


#v

, (5)
where 

represents potential individual e!ects invariant over time, the i's are the
anticipations of the interbank deposit rates to be included in the polynomial on
expectations (replacing the i's), #

(failures) is the variable intended to control
for time-varying risk, cost

is an indicator of the management costs computed as
12
Non-exogeneity plus potentially correlated individual e!ects imply the use of the IV estimators
considered by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991), among others.
We use the normalized weights [1/(1#(AO

/k))], where AO

is the time average of the
individual i branches and k"100. In any case we use and report White-robust heteroscedasticity
estimates.
(wages#other expenditures)/(loans#deposits), and v

stands for a zero mean
random disturbance that we will assume to be homoscedastic and uncorrelated
across banks and time. In practice, we will limit ourselves to considering
polynomials that include only 3 years (the current year and two anticipations)
and we will constrain the coe$cients to sum unity. Individual e!ects invariant
over time may stem in this equation from some omitted variables (in particular,
the risk premiums related to a specialized composition of the loans, or simply
their degree of diversi"cation).
To estimate the inverse of the elasticities to be included in (5), we use the
formulas developed in Appendix A substituting BK for B. The estimated matrices
BK

are obtained by using w

bK

as diagonal elements, and w

bK

in the corre-
sponding entries. The quantities are replaced by the vector of estimates of the
demands for new credit at time t, whose elements are lK

"a(

#a( 
z

#bK

rH

#
bK

rH

#bK

rH

, where a

is estimated as a(

"1/¹

(¸

!a( 
z

!bK

rH

!
bK

rH

!bK

rH

!K ¸

). For the concrete equilibria considered, see the next
section.
From an econometric point of view, some characteristics of these equations
must be noted. Firstly, the two equations form a simultaneous model, hence
¸ and rH are endogenous variables. In addition, the replacement of expected
values by observations in the second equation raises another source of correla-
tion with the error term. Secondly, both equations include the presence of
individual e!ects, presumably correlated with part of the included variables.
Thirdly, the sharp size inequality among banks, related to the number of
markets in which they operate, leads us to expect a strong cross-sectional
heteroscedasticity in the estimation of the demand relationship. We address
these questions in a GMM framework, estimating in "rst di!erences and using
heteroscedasticity corrections and robust statistics.
6. Econometric results
Table 3 reports the best results obtained in estimating the demand equation.
The estimation is carried out by treating the rH's, the loan proportions and the
loan failures indicator as endogenous variables, and the lag in total credit as
predetermined (see the table for details about the instruments used). The esti-
mated equation performs quite well and all the coe$cients present the right
signs and a nice interpretation. We only comment selectively and skip the
econometric details to save space.
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Table 3
Demand equation. No. of banks: 79; sample period: 1986}1991; no. of observations: 474; dependent
variable: ¸

.
Independent variables Parameters Estimation procedure: Di!erences, GMM
One-step estimates Two-step estimates
Proportion of markets a

1146.4 1155.2
(2.0) (2.3)
Regional GDP e!ects a

20.9 25.7
(1.4) (2.1)
GDP e!ects  foreign a

!160.7 !139.2
(!2.0) (!2.3)
rH

b

!283.4 !296.2
(!2.4) (!2.9)
rH

b

11.2 12.6
(1.8) (2.3)
rH

b

253.2 224.5
(2.4) (2.5)
¸



0.56 0.61
(2.38) (3.47)
mtg

¸



1.7 2.4
(1.4) (2.2)
mtg

¸



!13.5 !16.5
(!2.0) (!3.3)
#

¸



0.13 0.15
(1.68) (2.92)
Instruments Lag t!2 of ¸ in each cross section (6), ¸

,
mtg

, mtg

, commercial loans

, no. of
branches

, i

Statistics
m

!2.09 !2.45
m

0.45 0.58
Sargan test 5.43 1.67
(degrees of freedom) (5) (5)
The estimation sample is determined by the use as an instrument of the di!erences of the
dependent variable lagged twice.
For the GMM method in this context and the m statistics see Arellano and Bond (1991).
Robust t-ratios in parentheses.
Only the three "rst explanatory variables are considered exogenous.
Total instruments minus included variables.
On the whole, the average estimated  has a value of 0.81, with a cross-
sectional average standard deviation of 0.10, which increases over time (in the
last 2 years it reaches the values 0.13 and 0.17). Recall the rate's coe$cients
14
Sequential estimation procedures make it convenient to compute covariance matrices that take
into account the use of previously estimated variables in order to avoid misleading inferences (see,
for example, Newey, 1984; Pagan, 1986). We develop and apply a covariance estimation procedure
that takes into account that the price e!ects that make up BK have been previously estimated (we owe
the approach to Arellano). An appendix with the formulae is available upon request.
interpretation: the own-rate coe$cient represents the e!ect that a bank present
in all the local submarkets would have on its own demand, and the cross-rate
coe$cient is the e!ect of the rate set by a competitor encountered in every one of
these markets. Both coe$cients have the right sign, they are estimated with
remarkable precision, and the ratio of their values agrees with what is expected
from theory. Similarly, the rate set by the savings banks shows an important
e!ect of the right sign although somewhat upward-biased (for example, it
exceeds the average e!ect expected from rival banks; we attribute this to the use
of an aggregate rate whose e!ects are hard to disentange from other macroeco-
nomic factors).
When the own and cross coe$cients are used to estimate the whole Bmatrix,
and this matrix together with the estimated demands are employed to compute
the inverse of the semi-elasticities 1/


(or implied mark-ups), the results are
reasonable. For example, the average value of the Bertrand mark-ups is esti-
mated at 2.6 percentage points, which corresponds to an absolute value of the
elasticity of demand with respect to the real interest rate of 4.2.
Table 4 presents some estimates of the rates equation. We have systematically
estimated the alternative overlapped models that include, per turn, the com-
puted 1/


of the following equilibria: Bertrand, Cournot, collusion, Bertrand by
groups, Cournot by groups, collusion of the four biggest banks (and their
corporate groups), and collusion among all the national banks (and their
groups). We only report the results of the extreme cases of Bertrand and full
collusion and the models of partial collusion.
Estimation is carried out assuming that none of the included variables are
exogenous, and the set of instruments remain invariable. To ensure that inferen-
ces are robust to the use of previously estimated variables, we have computed,
for every equilibrium, two equation estimates and three sets of standard er-
rors. One-step estimates use a GMM weighting matrix } common to all the
equilibria } based on the instruments and the conventional disturbances struc-
ture to be expected from a panel-di!erencedmodel. Along one-step estimates we
report t-ratios corresponding to two types of standard errors: robust standard
errors, based on a consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance of the moments
that uses the estimated residuals, and corrected standard errors, based on the
additional consideration in the computation of this variance that one variable is
a previously estimated variable. Corrected standard errors indicate a consider-
ably lower degree of precision in the estimates of the coe$cients associated to
the previously computed variables. Two-step estimates then use the inverse of
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the more complete consistent estimation of the asymptotic variance of the
moments as a weighting matrix, to obtain the optimal or e$cient GMM
estimator, which gives low standard errors and high t-ratios. Changes in the
coe$cients are clearly small.
Several aspects of the estimations deserve comment. Firstly, all the
estimates strongly support the interbank anticipations speci"cation of the
marginal cost: the two anticipations included are always very signi"cant, and
the polynomial has a sensible pattern. Secondly, the varying risk seems to
be an important component of the rates set by banks. Thirdly, the approxi-
mation of the management unit costs performs quite well in every model, and its
coe$cient is not far from unity. Finally, and most important for our pur-
poses, in all the models (with the exception of the full collusion case) the
computed variables attract coe$cients not far from unity. This validates
the general size and meaning of the variables computed from the demand
estimates.
To select among models, we apply a Vuong-type test (see Vuong, 1989). The
Vuong test is a likelihood-ratio test to select among non-nested or overlapping
models. Given our method of estimation, we have adapted the test, computing it
with the GMManalogous to the likelihood ratio,N times the di!erence between
the minimized value of the objective function (Ogaki, 1993). That is, for every
two models, we compute the values
VT" N(J!J)
[(J

!J

)!N(J

!J

)]
,
where J

and J

are the respective minimized values of the objective function,
J

and J

are the individual values of the objective function evaluated at the
minimum, and N the number of observations. We expect this statistic
to be distributed as a N(0, 1) (for the working of the test see Table 5).
Alternatively, notice that the numerator of the test coincides with the
di!erence between the Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions, usually em-
ployed in testing the validity of moment restrictions. We apply the test with the
one-step estimates, which are all obtained with the same weighting matrix, in
order to reduce the sample variability e!ect associated with the estimation of
this matrix.
Table 5 reports the results of systematically comparing every pair of models.
The table shows that the simple Bertrand and Cournot equilibria are clearly
rejected against all the alternatives that embody some coordination of groups of
"rms, and only tend to be accepted as better models than full collusion. On the
other hand, Bertrand is accepted as better that Cournot, but is indistinguishable
fromCournot by groups. The rest of the tests are slightly more imprecise, but the
only model that always performs better than the alternatives is the model
corresponding to a price coordination of the national banks (see the last column
17
Table 5
Test of the price equilibrium hypotheses
Cournot Collusion Bertrand by Cournot by Four biggest
banks
National
banksgroups groups
colluding colluding
Bertrand 3.41 1.68 !2.51 !0.10 !2.26 !2.02
Cournot 1.56 !5.09 !28.47 !3.36 !2.76
Collusion !1.73 !1.66 !1.84 !2.06
Bertrand by groups 1.15 !1.26 !1.58
Cournot by groups !1.46 !1.73
Four biggest banks
colluding
!1.58
Vuong-type test, computed with the GMM analogous to the likelihood ratio.
Test values based on the one-step estimates.
A row value above (below) the critical value (minus the critical value) means that the row model can be
accepted as better (worse) than the column model.
Critical value at the 20% (10%, 5%) level of signi"cance in a one-sided test is 1.28 (1.64, 1.96).

Two-step estimates give similar test results, but rather more inconclusive. Price coordination of
the four biggest banks tends to be accepted as better than the rest of the models, but is indistinguish-
able from coordination of all national banks.
of the table). Given these results, the collusion of all national banks can be
claimed as the model that best "ts the data.

7. Welfare analysis
Let us now consider welfare analysis starting from our estimates. Fig. 1 de-
picts two possible loans market equilibria for a bank (Bertrand and a collusive
one). Independent (Bertrand) maximization implies setting a rate on loans
r (corresponding to the equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost
c"i#other components, given the rivals' rates), but collusion implies setting
a higher rate on a higher new credit demand curve (shifted because of the rivals'
simultaneous higher rates). The "gure illustrates the dead-weight loss attribu-
table to the Bertrand and collusive equilibria.
The welfare loss induced by market power in current new credit demand can
be computed by adequate integration of the areas under the demand curves
comprised between marginal costs and the rates charged by banks, and then
subtracting the pro"ts derived from market power. With linear demands, it is
18
Fig. 1. Dead-weight loss and monopoly pro"ts for a bank in the loans market. 1 ( ) ): demand for
loans; c: i# other marginal cost components; r, r: Bertrand and collusion rates; A: Bertrand
dead-weight loss; A#B: collusive dead-weight loss; C: collusive pro"ts.
See Spence (1976).
easy to show that all we need to carry out these computations are the individual
mark-ups and the own and cross-price e!ects. That is,
D"




l

(r
2r , z , c2c ) dz!

(r

!c

)l

(r)
"

(r

!c

)
b

2
(r

!c

)!

d

(r

!c

).
The selection of an equilibrium provides us with an estimate of the individual
price}cost mark-ups. In addition, as we also have an estimate of the most
competitive Bertrand mark-ups, we are able to split approximately our welfare
measure into two di!erent components: the proportion derived from the prede-
termined level of product di!erentiation, and the part attributable to the price
coordination of the "rms (see Fig. 1). To obtain intuitive measures, we scale
them according to the size of the market, in this case the total amount of
interests paid during the year for the new credit.
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On the other hand, assume that computations give a dead-weight loss D

at
time t. But, at this time, there are also remaining consumers paying the rates set
by banks for the credits opened the S previous years (¸

"



¸

). If
demand for new credit is more or less stationary and the dead-weight loss has
not changed too much over time, an additional rough estimate for the total or
accumulated current dead-weight loss is D"(1/(1!))D

.
The numbers implied by these exercises demonstrate that the consequences of
market power in the loans market are far from negligible. If we take the
colluding national banks as the market equilibrium, the average 1985}1991
relative dead-weight loss is evaluated at 8.2 percentage points, and 10 for the last
2 years. Up to one-fourth of this loss in some years was due to price coordina-
tion. The relative average monopoly pro"ts are evaluated in 19.1% of the
market, and one-tenth of these pro"ts arise from collusion. Keep in mind that
these are "gures for new credits each year. Taking these "gures as valid for the
whole market during the period studied, they imply that the accumulated
dead-weight loss in the loans market could have reached about one percentage
point of the national GDP those years.
8. Conclusion
We have presented a simple way to estimate constrained individual demand
price e!ects (using panel data), in a market with product di!erentiation where
many "rms compete in many submarkets. Then we have estimated a price
equation to assess the likelihood of di!erent equilibrium outcomes, using the
previous estimates to specify the corresponding "rms' mark-ups. This equation
is at the same time aimed at estimating the "rms' relevant marginal cost (or
marginal costs). Finally, the estimated demand parameters, together with the
equilibrium mark-ups, have provided an easy way to conduct welfare analysis.
The application of these methods to the assessment of competition in the
Spanish loans market from 1983 to 1991 has provided enlightening results in
a context which is not easy to analyse. The demand parameters have been
sensibly estimated and show a highly elastic demand for new credit. The target of
the banks also seems rightly modelled as aimed at establishing a margin over their
expectations on the interbank rates. The test to discriminate among equilibria
suggests that the type of strategic interaction that best "ts the data is the national
(and biggest) banks' internalizing each others' cross price e!ects, the rest of the
banks playing Bertrand. That is, we detect a price coalition practicing price
coordination during the period, with the result being a strong dead-weight loss.
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Appendix A. Obtaining the semielasticities
The matrix resolution of (3) and (3
), gives
1

"!(diagB)l, 1

"!(diagB)l and 1

"!Bl.
Now de"neC
	
as anNN selection (diagonal) matrix with ones in the diagonal
if the ith element corresponds to a "rm belonging to the g group and zero
otherwise, and C

as the selection matrix corresponding to a unique coalition h.
Then
1

"!(C
	
BC
	
)l,
1

"!(C
	
BC
	
)l
and
1

"![C

BC

#(I!C

)diagB]l.
Appendix B. Weighting scheme
For simplicity, we drop the time subindex. Let O

be the branches of bank
i in provincem. We will assume that the number of local submarkets in province
m equals the number of branches of the bank with the highest number,
maxO

,2,O	, and we compute the per-market average number of com-
petitors in provincem as

O

/maxO

,2,O	. To account for the variabil-
ity in the number of competitors across markets, we will compute the ratios
comp

, normalizing the average numbers of competitors by the global average
1/51

(

O

/maxO

,2,O	) computed at the sample time midpoint
1987. Total submarkets, estimated for the same moment, will simply be


maxO

,2,O	.
According to these calculations, we approximate K

/K by
w

"

O

/

maxO

,2,O	. Coincidences are a bit more problematic.
We have to assume that the presences are completely overlapped, and de"ne
the market coincidences between i and j in province m as minO

,O

	.
21
Our approximation to K

/K will then be w

"

(minO

, O

	comp

)/


maxO

,2,O	.
To account for the variability of the savings banks' competitive pressure by
provinces, we have computed the ratios C

, de"ned as the quotients O

/

O

normalized by the global ratio of branches in 1987.
The raw data on branches are an imperfect indicator of the presence of banks
by submarkets. Firstly, branches cover all banking services and the importance
of lending may di!er according to specialization (this is especially important for
industrial and foreign banks). Secondly, the smallest banks tend to have a few
larger branches which are not fully comparable. Therefore, we ultimately used
numbers of &adjusted branches' in our computations (the numbers of real
branches multiplied by a ratio representing the variability in employment
numbers attributable to the lending activity).
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